When I see "Tinder + LinkedIn" I think of a version of tinder that relentlessly spams users, and practically only possible to block with a filter. "Tinder for finding business partners" however sounds great
If the tenant is supposedly blasting the aircon, with the windows open in 114 degree heat ... I'm not sure an alternate explanation is needed. (Not to mention, bitcoin mining requires a lot more than cheap-to-free electricity)
That's what I'm doing now. It's actually hosted on AWS, and I dropped the price to $1/month and still have trouble selling it. The site is https://www.bitcoinvigil.com if think I'm doing something obviously wrong
Obviously, your problem is what you aren't good at, marketing. And one reason for that I will surmise, if I am any example of that, is that you hate marketing? Right? I can tell just by the way you write about it. I am an researcher and engineer who can't seem to sell water to a rich thirsty man.
Although, I'm not a bitcoin guy, I think you probably have a good product/service idea. You might just want to sit on it for a while, and let the need for it rise. More bitcoin thefts will make it so, and that situation may eventually raise its ugly head.
Also, keep a lookout for somebody who is good at marketing, but understands your product. They will be able to do the market research, and find out where your efforts need to be. And, for the most part, there are people who seem to love it, at least more than you (or I) do.
Keep at it, make improvements every once in a while, remember to blog about it, keeping it alive, and maybe rethink your $1/month price, as that may seem too cheap to somebody who wants to protect $1000's of bitcoins.
Maybe come up with a tiered product service? Good Luck!
Thanks for the words of encouragement. You're completely right, I loath marketing and sales and terrible at it. I kind of lived in a delusion for a while that if I made the product good enough, it could sell itself.
The $1/month has been an unmitigated disaster. I'm making peanuts from it, (yay, credit-card fees!) and it severely damages the "value" of the company when I'm trying to sell to a big customer. I'm almost tempted to just make it free
Note: This is only safe if your computer doesn't have bitcoin stealing malware. Before you use this, it's not a bad idea to throw $5 in a Bitcoin Vigil money pot, and get notified if your computer gets any bitcoin stealing malware.
Even if you're not using Bitcoin, having a Bitcoin honeypot on your machine may be a great way to early-detect intrusion. It's such a tempting target for viruses and blackhats these days, I'm happy to sacrifice a few dollars to know that I've been compromised.
I'm using https://www.bitcoinvigil.com/ which is very slick but I may build my own equivalent of this at some point and shove the wallet.dat on all of my machines.
It seems like Bitcoin Vigil can only protect non-Bitcoin users. If you have a "money pot" and real money stored on your computer the malware will just steal both.
Exactly, I don't see how this is useful for bitcoin users at all. They notify me after all my bitcoins have been stolen? Great.
I can see this being useful as a canary to let you know someone has acquired unfettered access to your device, but it doesn't seem very practical for high value targets (who cares about $5 of bitcoin if there's far more valuable info to steal), or if the attacker decides to steal the bitcoin wallet file and only transfer coins a few weeks later after he's already taken advantage of the other info he got off the target device (and by then you probably already know you've been compromised anyway).
unlock the $5 every login. it will be stolen much faster than the wallet that you load only a few times (not to buy drugs, just to count your bit coins, or maybe take a dive on all those bits in your huge storage fort)
Your real wallet has a password (encrypted) while the "money pot" is not. It will be stolen much faster (read: immediately) while the encrypted one relies on you entering a passphrase
true. if you want to try a wallet that offers multisig via 2fa, which should protects you more from the above risk, you may want to give https://greenaddress.it a go.
It's not really, a honeypot (ha, title relevant) like this only works if it is obscure, as soon as everybody is aware of them the game changes significantly. If being a persistent threat is more valuable than the honeypot to the attacker, they just won't touch the honeypot until they are found out or on their way out anyway.
At best it's confirmation that you have been compromised, not evidence that you have not.
No fraud or scam. Bitcoin users have acted very aggressively to the idea -- and felt best to censor it.
What they seem to not realize, is that double spend attacks were very viable previously (putting conflicting transactions in different part of the network), submitting double-spends directly to pools, finley attack etc.
The thing bitundo brings to the table is legitimacy. People can undo a transaction without foreknowledge they will need to. This is nothing but a good thing for the bitcoin network, and it reminds people that 0-confirmation transaction never were, and never will be safe.
Double spends are not currently "very viable", as indicated by the fact that they were not happening and accepting instant payment is the standard. This is objective reality, not something you can argue away. A different world being theoretically possible does not translate into it magically happening with no effort. You are making an effort to change our happy situation for your own profit, in other words, to make Bitcoin less useful over the long run to benefit yourself in the short run. I can't tell if you're motivated by greed or a particularly poorly thought out world view.
Also, why are you claiming this is somehow specific to unconfirmed transactions? Corrupt miners can also rewrite the block chain. If you get paid enough and have enough hash power, why not see if you can overtake the chain head? So don't claim it's somehow specific to unconfirmed transactions. It isn't.
Bitcoin fundamentally assumes that the majority of mining power is "honest", defined to mean following the rules laid down by Satoshi in the core software. You can see this by simply reading the white paper:
"The system is secure as long as honest nodes collectively control more CPU power than any cooperating group of attacker nodes."
(last sentence, first page)
You are attempting to bribe miners to become "dishonest" and "attack the network" in Satoshi's language. If enough people did what you suggest, the system's fundamental assumption would be invalidated and the entire network would break. If merely a small number of people do it, it just makes the system unreliable, untrustworthy and pushes people towards centralised fixes like payment processors that levy higher fees, trusted third parties that prevent double spending, secure hardware, etc. All things that increase Bitcoin's costs and reduce its competitiveness vs regular banking. Doing this doesn't help anyone or prove any point, it just adds sand into an otherwise useful system by increasing transaction costs.
tl;dr you are like a kid kicking down someone's sandcastle on a beach, then saying "they should have been guarding it better, anyone could have done what i did!".
To be fair, if comparing Bitcoin to a sandcastle is a fair comparison, then it's better for this to be made obvious to everybody before it reaches critical mass.
Perhaps more importantly, this feature doesn't actually rely on miners being dishonest. There is no rewriting of the blockchain going on. All that is required is that miners are greedy. That is, when two conflicting transactions are in the mempool, it requires that miners prefer the transaction that comes with a higher fee.
I think people involved with it over the long term have always said that it's a risky experiment that might fail. Bitcoin resembles a sandcastle far more than a honey badger, that's for sure.
"Honesty" is defined to mean "following the rules". The first seen rule is a part of that set. BitUndo isn't attempting to fork the chain today, but they certainly could - it's a simple extension of their model. Double spending for a fee doesn't really care whether a tx is unconfirmed or not, it simply alters the price charged.
Security isn't a binary yes/no thing and double-spending-for-a-fee does not require unconfirmed transactions. Confirmed txns can be replaced too, it just costs more.
> Bitcoin users have acted very aggressively to the idea -- and felt best to censor it.
It's not even ironic anymore when they respond in this fashion. They'd probably even remind you that only the government can technically "censor" something, and that if people want accurate news on Bitcoin they are free to pick a competitor to /r/bitcoin that will provide it.
There's too many variables to give a simple answer. It depends on the current state of the network (the miners mempools), the priority of your transaction, the fee/bytes of your transaction, and what % of the hashing power bitundo has. Some transactions take a few blocks to get confirmed, these are the ones that have a much, much higher likelyhood of being undone.