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Is there some high-level overview of this "cascade of Ribbon filters" data structure? I understand bloom filters, but couldn't get any intuition for this one from FB's blog post.

edit: found an overview here that helps a bit: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27800788 This seems good but will take more time to absorb: https://pangyoalto.com/en/ribbon-filter/


I've been using the 'DB Folder' and 'Dataview' plugins, I'll definitely look into this new option. Does it work with Dataview at all?


What does the verifiable program do though? With a VPN, what I'm concerned about is my traffic not being sniffed and analyzed. This code seem to have something to do with keys but it's not clear how that helps...?


This is the server-side part of things. It receives encrypted traffic from your (and other customers) device, and routes it to the Internet.

This guarantees that your traffic isn't being linked to you, and is mixed up with others in a way that makes it difficult for someone to attribute it to you, as long as you also protect yourself on the application side (clear cookies, no tracking browser extension, etc)


> This guarantees that your traffic isn't being linked to you, and is mixed up with others in a way that makes it difficult for someone to attribute it to you

What would prevent you (or someone who has gained access to your infrastructure) from routing each connection to a unique instance of the server software and tracking what traffic goes in/out of each instance?


Nothing, it's not technically possible to prevent that with their system.


No. The verifiable part receives an already-decrypted copy of your traffic and mixes it with everyone else's traffic. Source: https://vp.net/l/en-US/technical#:~:text=cryptographic%20dat...

I have not inspected whether the procedure suggested for verifying the enclave contents is correct. It's irrelevant if you need to prove that the decrypted traffic, while still being associated with your identity, goes ONLY into the enclave and is not sent to, let's say, KGB via a separate channel.


(First off, duskwuff's attack is pretty epic. I do feel like there might be a way to ensure there is only exactly one giant server--not that that would scale well--but, it also sounds like you didn't deal with it ;P. The rest of my comment is going to assume that you only have a single instance.)

A packet goes in to your server and a packet goes out of your server: the code managing the enclave can just track this (and someone not even on the same server can figure this out almost perfectly just by timing analysis). What are you, thereby, actually mixing up in the middle?

You can add some kind of probably-small (as otherwise TCP will start to collapse) delay, but that doesn't really help as people are sending a lot of packets from their one source to the same destination, so the delay you add is going to be over some distribution that I can statistics out.

You can add a ton of cover traffic to the server, but each interesting output packet is still going to be able to be correlated with one input packet, and the extra input packets aren't really going to change that. I'd want to see lots of statistics showing you actually obfuscated something real.

The only thing you can trivially do is prove that you don't know which valid paying user is sending you the packets (which is also something that one could think might be of value even if you did have a separate copy of the server running for every user that connected, as it hides something from you)...

...but, SGX is, frankly, a dumb way to do that, as we have ways to do that that are actually cryptographically secure -- aka, blinded tokens (the mechanism used in Privacy Pass for IP reputation and Brave for its ad rewards) -- instead of relying on SGX (which not only is, at best, something we have to trust Intel on, but something which is routinely broken).


letsencrypt launched 3 years before git-lfs


That's already a domain name and a more complicated setup without a public static IP in home environments, and in corporate environments now you're dealing with a whole process etc. that might be easier to get through by.. paying out for github LFS.

I think it is a much bigger barrier than ssh and have seen it be one on short timeline projects where it's getting set up for the first time and they just end up paying github crazy per GB costs, or rat nests of tunnels vpn configurations for different repos to keep remote access with encryption with a whole lot more trouble than just an ssh path.


Letsencrypt was founded 2012, but become available in the wild December 2015. git-lfs mid-2014. So same era in general.


You're right, I had the wrong date for LFS on GitHub.


Why? They can't read my CV? Send me an email if you need clarifications. Don't waste my time trying to appeal to a bot.


> Still, stretched-thin HR teams say it’s the only way to handle thousands of applicants.


I don't browse thousands phone chargers to buy one. I browse maybe 10-20.


Unfortunately education everywhere is getting really hurt by access to AI, both from students who are enabled to not their homework, and by teacher review/feedback being replaced by chatbots.


Yeah that's not happening. In fact most services with free tiers still ask for a credit card number, and if not still ask for a lot of information. It is a marketing scheme after all.


Who is "we"? What are "container plugins"?


You should probably only ignore an email if it only contains one of those patterns. There might be a long, informative comment that just happens to contain "me too" of "following" somewhere...

(if my reading is wrong and that's already how it works, apologies)


Updated gist and the comment.

Thanks for the suggestion..


You could describe this same project as "a smart pipe that punches through NATs & stays connected (...)" and it wouldn't be any more surprising or inaccurate than the current description. So maybe it is not that descriptive.


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