In May 1937, Associate Justice Owen Roberts, who had previously been a reliable conservative vote on the Court, voted with the liberal wing of the Court in upholding a state minimum wage law. This unexpected switch gave the Court a 5-4 majority in favor of upholding the New Deal legislation, and effectively ended Roosevelt's plans to expand the Court.
It's absolutely ludicrous to say he outmaneuvered them. Roberts conceded and FDR abandoned his plans to pack the court.
FDR did not abandon his plans because of a change in the court's jurisprudence. He abandoned them because he ran into insurmountable opposition from his own party that killed the plan. The House Judiciary chairman called it unconstitutional, for example, and it repeatedly failed votes in the Senate Judiciary committee. It had been made abundantly clear by mid-year that the bill had no chance of passing, hence its failure; otherwise, he would have pushed for it regardless of what the court ruled in West Coast Hotel. Even still, he complied with prior court rulings that had struck down parts of the New Deal after his efforts failed.
I think Caesar had carte blanche control over his soldiers, and FDR didn't (which I, and I think even he, would agree was a good thing). I think FDR was elected to a preexisting constitutional office for a predefined term by the people of the nation, while Caesar had himself ad-hoc declared 'Dictator for life' by an undemocratic Senate he effectively held at sword point. I think that that FDR operated under restrictions (which he did at times try to loosen, with varying degrees of success), while Caesar had virtually none (save for factors that motivated some of his policymaking, such as keeping those soldiers happy).
Obviously you believe in populism, economic and/or otherwise, so I suppose you think it is a good thing that someone like Caesar was able to act largely without restrictions in implementing his plans; I don't think a lack of checks is a good thing, even if I believe the policy being implemented is itself good (though Caesar did do things I think were wrong, particularly on the military front, Gaul, etc.). I guess that's just a difference of opinion that we have.
I disagree that Caesar had total control over his soldiers. Labienus and Antony alone among his legates shows that loyalty to Caesar had very real limits that could either turn into antipathy or debauchery. The diadem incident showed that whatever the intent was, Caesar was limited in what he could do.
I don't believe that violation of precedent leads to positive outcomes and that each violation destroys its own foundation, but I also believe that slavish adherence to a stultified and failing system of precedence leads to outcomes that mimic the proverb "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." Lawfare is another kind of civic death, as Cato demonstrated multiple times. So if you want to call opposition to terminal ossification "populism" then sure, you've got me.
> The diadem incident showed that whatever the intent was, Caesar was limited in what he could do.
I largely think this is a good place to leave this conversation, but I can't help but point out that when the limit is 'you can't openly declare yourself king in a nation whose fundamental character is defined as opposition to monarchy', there isn't much of a real limit.
Ultimately, from what I understand, the post-civil war opposition to Caesar was less about what he did than how he did it, so I think that yes, that was a very real limit. If he had or even wanted the kind of total and repressive control that is frequently hinted at but never entirely substantiated (and I think our picture of that control is colored very much by the post-Augustan emperors) along with his supposed revolutionary ambition, then becoming a hereditary king would have been very much the logical conclusion, yet there's very little evidence that Caesar, unlike say Napoleon (or even Cromwell) aimed at this.
If he did aim at it, he did it uncharacteristically poorly. True, his dictatorship ended prematurely so it's ultimately a counterfactual in any case, but keeping your enemies around after they've been defeated in order to declare yourself king at some point after returning from another multi-year military campaign triggers my sense of absolute disbelief, but your mileage may vary.
I think it more likely that the suppression of the Tribunes, the diadem incident, etc. were constructed by others attempting to gin up the fears of "a nation whose fundamental character is defined as opposition to monarchy." I believe that Caesar was among the best of the Romans.
I hope that in 2024, we will successfully recover some lost works via the Vesuvius Prize to justify or refute this position with more direct evidence.
> keeping your enemies around after they've been defeated
I don't think this specifically is evidence of much. Caesar did this all the time; he believed (ultimately incorrectly in my view, based on the way he died), that he would be much better served by brining these people to his side, with their existing powerbases and supporters.
> were constructed by others
Some of it could have been, I guess? But he certainly didn't have to take the bait and remove the tribunes, and the accounts of the diadem incident I've read suggest he knew it would happen ahead of time.
> I believe that Caesar was among the best of the Romans.
Fair enough, you're entitled to your opinion. But I gotta say, the stuff I've read about what he did in Gaul and elsewhere makes it impossible for me to view him as any sort of paragon. I'm not saying he was a unique sort of evil or anything (obviously not, the Roman Republic was an expansionist state whose history is littered with atrocities), but I don't find myself feeling very charitable towards him.
>Caesar did this all the time; he believed (ultimately incorrectly in my view, based on the way he died), that he would be much better served by brining these people to his side, with their existing powerbases and supporters.
Yes, but this all occurred prior to his dictatorship. Coalitions are needed when sovereignty is in doubt. If he intended to be king or imperator (and allegedly already was de facto), what incentives does he have to effectively double the elites requiring patronage and titles? Praetors and consuls were limited as were provincial commands. And the Proscriptions were fresh enough in everyone's mind (and subsequently repeated after his death) that it doesn't jive with me that a Rex Caesar needed former Pompeiians to justify his rule when both his ability to rule and his pool of seized wealth to distribute were negatively impacted by their rehabilitation.
>But he certainly didn't have to take the bait and remove the tribunes, and the accounts of the diadem incident I've read suggest he knew it would happen ahead of time.
Given the need of Caesar to be seen as doing the "right thing" rather than the "public thing" I think it's understandable why he would defend citizens and supporters against spurious charges drummed up to harm him. It recalls the episode where Marcus Claudius Marcellus had a Transpadane magistrate whipped (something forbidden to be done to Roman citizens) because Caesar had treated them as citizens while not actually being so. I imagine events like that hit a sore spot personally and not simply puncturing his auctoritas. Something akin to Buzz Aldrin punching a conspiracy theorist in the face for calling him a liar and a phony.
The diadem incident was a scissor statement regardless of who actually orchestrated it. Opponents would see it as testing the waters for kingship and allies an explicit repudiation of it. Given what I perceive to be Caesar's prudence and the desperation of his opponents to manufacture opposition, I find the latter motivation to be more credible, by far.
>But I gotta say, the stuff I've read about what he did in Gaul and elsewhere makes it impossible for me to view him as any sort of paragon.
I meant specifically as a Roman, not necessarily under modern mores. Caesar in my mind was a necessary force rather than a desirable one. Yet I will admit that I'm in the minority when it comes to "cruel necessity" in war, particularly conducted by those that abide by tit for two tats. I think I would rather have punctuated Gaulish atrocities, Sacks of Wexford, Burning of Atlantas, and Hiroshimas than continual and ineffective warfare that sacrifices more real humans and real wealth for slower but larger meat grinders led by forgotten and incompetent men. In short, there are only two kinds of historical personages: the ones people complain about and the ones nobody remembers.
> Coalitions are needed when sovereignty is in doubt.
Every leader requires a coalition to stay in power, not just to achieve it.
> what incentives does he have to effectively double the elites requiring patronage and titles
As shown by Cato killing himself rather than accept clemency, it put those who accepted it into a massive debt of honor to Caesar and was massively useful in helping turn those he pardoned to his side. Caesar himself clearly understood this, per what he reportedly said upon hearing of Cato's death - "O Cato, I begrudge you your death; for you begrudged me the sparing of your life."
> allies an explicit repudiation of it
This would be far more credible if he wasn't sitting on a golden throne on a raised dais when Marc Antony presented him the diadem.
> I think I would rather have punctuated Gaulish atrocities
I don't think the Gallic atrocities that Caesar himself recounted were necessary for the most part. And yes, all major historical figures are complained about, but some complaints are more valid than others.
It's absolutely ludicrous to say he outmaneuvered them. Roberts conceded and FDR abandoned his plans to pack the court.